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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
TRACY COLLINS BANK AND
TRUST CO.,

J

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

14,125

FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK,
and UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT
CO., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

,

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a trust deed foreclosure action,

Plaintiff-

Respondent Tracy Collins (Tracy) brought an action to foreclose
a trust deed on the subject property and joined Appellants
First Security State Bank and Utah Title and Abstract Company
(Utah Title) as defendants and alleged that their rights were
subsequent and inferior to Tracy's. First Security State
Bank also prayed for foreclosure against the debtor.

The

lower court determined priority in favor of Tracy and gave
judgment of foreclosure against the debtor first to Tracy
and then to First Security State Bank.

The question presented
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-2is whether First Security State Bank is entitled to
priority over Tracy because although Tracy had recorded
a trust deed in its favor on March 16, 1973 Tracy did not
lend nor was obliged to lend any money or otherwise create
a debt secured by said trust deed and in fact did not use
or activate the note for which the trust deed was security
until May 10, 1974 which date is subsequent to the recording of First Security State Bank's trust deed.

Tracy's trust

deed was not part of a construction loan transaction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, presiding, determined that Tracy's trust deed
was entitled to priority over First Security State Bank's
trust deed and awarded judgment of foreclosure giving
Tracy right to the first proceeds derived from the foreclosure of the property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
First Security State Bank and Utah Title seek
reversal of the lower court's decision as to the relative
priority of First Security State Bank's lien, and ask this
Court to determine that the effective date of Tracy's
lien was May 10, 197 4 and therefore subject to and inferior to First Security State Bank's lien.
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-3STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 14, 1973, Richard H. Seiger and

Connie Seiger executed a $50,000 note payable to Tracy
(Exhibit 1-P), which note was secured by a trust deed of
the same date on certain real property in Salt Lake County,
which trust deed was recorded on March 16, 19 73 (Exhibit
2-P).

Tracy sought to foreclose said deed as a mortgage

in this action.
2.

A note from Jerry and Ann Timothy to First

Security State Bank secured by a trust deed covering the
above real property was executed August 24, 1973

and

said trust deed was recorded August 28, 1973 (Exhibit 9-D).
After being joined as a defendant, First Security State
Bank also prayed for foreclosure of said deed as a mortgage.
3.

From the time of the execution of the

March 14, 19 73

Seiger note and trust deed in favor of

Tracy and until May 10, 19 7 4 , i t is clear from the
testimony of Robert Bagley, an assistant vice president
of Tracy, that:
(a)

Tracy disbursed no funds nor made any
advances under the $50,000 note to the
Seigers, or to any other person or
account (R. 275);

(b)

Tracy did not establish any account
whatever on the $50,000 note (R. 275);

(c)

Tracy did not consider the $50,000
note of March 14, 1973 an indebtedness
of Seigers until May 10, 1974 (R. 282-83);

(d)

No interest accrued on said note (R. 264);
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-4(e) Although the $50,000 March 14, 1973
note was due by its own terms on June
1, 1973, no efforts were made to
collect it because said note was
not then considered by Tracy to be
an obligation of the Seigers (R. 281).
4.

Tracy did not consider the $50,000 note an

indebtedness of Seigers until May 10, 1974, when on that
date Tracy used the $50,000 note for the first time for
any purpose, and at that time for the purpose of renewing an
existing $55,000 note of Seiger Distribution Co. on which
note $48,323.51 was owed.

(R. 262-63).

5.. Mr. Bagley also testified that May 10,
1974, was the first time that any accounting of any nature
was set up for the $50,000 Seiger note.
6.

(R. 270, 275).

Mr. Bagley stated that the $50,000 note

did not become an indebtedness of Seigers until the time of
renewal of the prior note of Seiger Distributing Co. by
Tracy in May, 1974.
7.

(R. 282).

By its clear terms the trust deed to Tracy

was security only for the $50,000 note and does not refer
to any other security or indebtedness whatever.

(exhibit

2-P) .
8.

There is no evidence whatever of any

obligation incurred by Tracy in March, 1973, to advance
any funds pursuant to the $50,000 note at that or any
other time.
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-5ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OBLIGATION
ON TRACY TO ADVANCE FUNDS AND NO
FUNDS WERE ADVANCED UNTIL MAY 10,
19 74, TRACY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
PRIORITY BEFORE THAT DATE.
The fundamental issue on appeal is whether a
trust deed creates a lien entitled to priority where
there is no obligation underlying the trust deed.
The general rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. 2d
Mortgages §§ 132, 133:
The dominant feature of a real-estate
mortgage is generally regarded as that of
security for the debt, to which it is collateral, appurtenant, or an accessory, and
on which it is dependant. In other words,
the debt secured by a mortgage is regarded
as the primary obligation between the
parties, and the mortgage is incidental
to the indebtedness or obligation secured
thereby. Under this rule, the lien of a
mortgage is regarded as no greater than
the actual debt secured.

The existence of an obligation to be
secured is an essential element of a mortgage. The mortgage has no efficacy if
unaccompanied by a debt or obligation,
either pre-existing, created at the time,
or contracted to be created.
The trust deed (Exhibit 2-P) given priority by
the lower court recites the obligation as follows:
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-6The subject property is transferred to
the Trustee for the purpose of securing the
following:
ONE: Payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a Promissory Note executed as of
even date herewith in the face amount of
$50,000 and any renewals and/or extensions and/
or modifications thereof together with
interest thereon, prepayment penalties (which
are also applied if the payment of the note
is accelerated by reason of default) and other
charges provided in said note.
TWO: Payment of further advances and
interest thereon, which may be made by
Beneficiary as provided herein*

17. Upon the request of the Trustor or
his successors in ownership of the land, the
Beneficiary may hereafter at its option, at
any time before full payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, make further advances to
the Trustor or his successors in ownership,
and the same, with interest and late charges,
shall be secured by this Trust Deed; . . .
(Emphasis Supplied).
The note (Exhibit 1-P) recites simply that the
Seigers promise to pay $50,000 on demand or 9 3 days after
date (March 14, 197 3) to Tracy and that the same is secured
by a "2nd Trust Deed to Payee, dated 2-26-7 3 on business
property."
Mr. Robert D. Bagley, Tracy's own witness, testified as follows concerning said note:

(R. 270)

Q.

So, in fact, in March of 1973 when

the note and trust deed were given there were no funds
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-7disbursed by the Bank to an account, to Seigers, or to
anybody else?
A.

From the —

(R. 275)

Q.

not from the $50,000.

And then

no funds were disbursed at

that time, no account was set up, nothing was done with reference to those two documents until May of 1974*
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And then in May of 1974, I think May 10th,

1974, you transferred in essence, funds from the $50,000
note in essence, you made it an active note at that time,
is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So would it be a fair statement to say that

as of May 10th, 1974 that was the first time that any
funds or any accounting of any nature was set up on the
$50,000 note dated March 14th, 1973?
A.

Yes.

(R. 281)

Q.

Mr. Bagley, I have just handed you

Exhibit P-l and that is the note involved in 19 73, can you
tell me when that note was due?
A.

June 1, 1973.
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-8Q.

And was it paid on June 1, 197 3?

A.

It was not.

Q.

So June 1, '73, you didn't refer it to your

A.

No, not at that date.

Q-

Nor make any other attempt at collection?

A.

No.

attorneys?

(R. 282)
Q.

A.

March 14, '73.

At that point did you get any authority to

lend Mr. Seiger an additional $50,000 such that the total
amount of his obligation to Tracy Collins would be $105,000?
A.

Well, here again the $50,000 wasn't con-

sidered indebtedness to Mr. Seiger at that point.

(R. 283)
note did not come —

Q.

So we may say then that the $50,000

let's say was not outstanding and an

indebtedness of Mr. Seiger until that time, [May 10, 1974],
that's right, is it not?
A.

That's correct.
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-9Q.

At anytime after June 1 of 1973 you could

have disbursed the funds on the $50,000 note in payment
of the $55,000 note could you?
A.

That's correct.

(R. 265)

Q.

As a matter of fact, it could be

drawn on for various purposes, couldn't it?
A.

Yes, there was no stipulation as to

appointed amount of money for a particular purpose.

(R. 266)
these notes were —

Q.

On May 10th or at the time that

or the funds "were disbursed on the

$50,000 note, Exhibit 1-P, was notice sent to Mr, Seiger
of that action?
A.

Yes, not from me, however, from our counsel,

(R. 261)

Q.

And were the funds that are shown

on that $50,000, was that actually disbursed?
A.

Yes it was.

Q.

When was that disbursed?

A.

I can't remember the exact date.

Q.

Would you like to refer to the note?

A.

Yes, if I may, please.

May 10th, 1974.
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-10Q.

What was the amount of money that was

actually disbursed?
A.

$48,323.51.

Q.

How does that note relate to the $55,000

note that is Exhibit 3-P?
A.

Well, the $55,000 was renewed to the

$50,000, in other words, the funds from the undisbursed
money, the $50,000 were used to pay off the $55,0 00 note.
Q.

Now, does that show on both notes?

A.

Yes it does.

Q.

Can you explain those figures for the court

and counsel?

Explain what happened, where the $55,000

note, Exhibit 3-P was reduced to zero.
A.

On May 10th, 1974, the balance of the note

was transferred from the $55,000 note to the renewal note
for $50,000 and that amount that was transferred is

—

shows on the back of the $50,000 note.

(R. 263)

THE COURT:

I understand the $55,000

note is paid?
THE WITNESS:

Renewed.
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-11Th e conclusion which must be drawn from the
above testimony of Tracy's own witness is that the
note, Exhibit 1-P, did not represent any kind of a
debt or obligation of the Seigers until May 10, 19 74,
which debt was not due and payable until 10 days after
the demand made in Exhibit 5-P, which was May 23, 19 74.
A trust deed or mortgage must be supported by
an obligation or fail*

"A mortgage is incident to the

obligation which it is given to secure."

First National

Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57
P.2d 1401.
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-19(3) (1953)
defines a trust deed as follows:
(3) "Trust Deed" means a deed executed
in conformity with this act and conveying
real property to a trustee in trust to secure
the performance of an obligation of the
grantor or other person named in the deed
to a beneficiary.
(Emphasis supplied).
Section 57-1-20 provides:
Transfers in trust of real property may
be made to secure the performance of an
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary.
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
Section 57-1-35 provides:
The transfer of any debt secured by a
trust deed shall operate as a transfer of
the security therefor*
(Emphasis supplied).
The idea consistantly contained in the above sections of
the Code is that a trust deed is a security device to
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-12secure a debt or obligation.

Tracy 1 s witness

clearly stated that the $50,000 note was not an
obligation of its makers until long after Appellants'
security interest was perfected.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Freutel vs.
Schmitz, 299 Illinois 320, 132 N.E. 534 stated:
A mortgage is security for a debt, and without
a debt it has no effect as a lien . . .
A
mortgage may be taken to secure future advances, but it can only take effect as a lien
from the time some debt or liability secured
by it is created. If there is no mortgage
debt or obligation in existence, there is
nothing for the mortgage to operate on and
the lien begins only when the money is advanced or the contemplated debt comes into
existence in the course of dealing with the
parties. The lien is measured by the extent
of the advances and the amount of the debt.
In Ginsberg v. Capitol City Wrecking Company,
300 Mich. 712, 2 N.W.2d 892, the Supreme Court of Michigan
in discussing a mortgage stated:
The instrument can only take effect as a
mortgage or encumbrance from the time when
some debt or liability shall be created, or
some binding contract is made, which is to be
secured by it. Until this takes place,
neither the land nor the parties, nor the
third persons, are bound by it. It constitutes, of itself, no binding contract.
Either party may either disregard or repudiate
it at its pleasure. It is but part of an
arrangement, merely contemplated as probable
and which can only be rendered effectual by
the future consent and future act of the
parties. 2 N.W. 2d at 894.
Failure of Respondent Tracy to perfect its
attempted lien by creating an obligation or debt renders
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-13th e unperfected lien subject to subordination in
priority to valid subsequent liens until the date
Tracy acknowledges a debt was created.

Its inchoate

lien was capable of perfection or vesting only when
the debt arose.
The reversal of the trial court in the instant
case would do no harm to "future advance mortgages" used
to secure construction loans, or impair additional
security mortgages given to secure antecedent debts.
In both of the latter cases, adequate safeguards are
available to insure that these devices are enforceable
and provide priority protection.

The case law clearly

indicates, however, that a note and mortgage instrument,
even if recorded, are effective as of the date of
recording only where funds are advanced against the
note, or there is a present enforceable obligation
undertaken at the date of recording to make future
advances, or the mortgage is securing a specific and
identified antecedent debt recited in the mortgage or
trust deed instrument.
The above rule regarding future advances was
stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Second National
Bank of Warren v. Boyle, 155 Ohio 484, 99 N."E.2d 474:
Obviously where there is no obligation to make
future advances, a mortgage, purporting to
secure such future advances, cannot secure such
advances until the advances have been made. Until
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-14th en so far as such advances are concerned,
there is nothing for the mortgage to secure; and
the provisions of such a mortgage merely represent an expression of the intention of the
mortgagor and the mortgagee that the mortgage
shall operate as a security for the obligations
of the mortgagor with respect to such advances
if and when such obligations arise. At most,
those provisions represented the offer by the
mortgagor to provide the security of the
mortgage for such advances if and when, they
are made.
Future advance arrangements without a current
debt have been variously called "cross-security clauses,"
dragnet clauses", or "anaconda mortgages".

G. Gilmore,

Security Interests in Personal Property § 35.2 at 918
(1965).

Such arrangements are "not highly regarded in

equity.

They should be carefully scrutinized and strictly

construed."

First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712, 715, 28 N.W.2d

509, 511, 172 A.L.R. 1072, 1075 (1947).

And stated

another way:
Mortgages of this character have been denominated "Anaconda mortgages" and are. well named
thus, as by their broad and general terms they
enwrap the unsuspecting debtor in the folds of
indebtedness embraced and secured in the
mortgage which he did not contemplate.
Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421
(1929) .
Such clauses should only be enforced where a
rule of reason and good faith are applied to the mortgagee
and subsequent intervening lienors.

The conceptual analysi

of the validity of a mortgage providing for future advances
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-15but where there is no present advance, is described as
follows:
There can be no mortgage without a debt;
if there is ever a moment when there is
no debt, then there is no mortgage; if
there is no mortgage, there is nothing
to which the future advances can "relate
back".
G. Gilmore, Supra, at § 35.3 at 924.
Even where optional future advances are agreed
upon, it is not settled whether the advance can relate back:
Where an agreement provides for optional
future advances and no advance is made when
the mortgage is executed, the mortgage does
not become effective until the first advance
is made; it does not relate back to the date
of the agreement.
Osborne on Mortgages, § 114 (1951).
All the commentators seem to agree that some
commitment recited in the security instrument on the
part of the mortgagee to supply advances in the ascertainable future is essential.

See H. E. Meeks, Mortgage

Provivions Extending the Lien to Future Advances and
Antecedent Indebtedness, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 443-51 (1973).
The case law and authorities cited indicate
that a security instrument given to secure future advances is given priority as of the date of recordation only
if there is a contractual obligation to make the future
advances.

See also, 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, § 140.
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-16In the instant case, there is no evidence of such a contractual obligation.
the contrary.

In fact, Tracy's own evidence is to

Any disbursements were in Tracy's sole

discretion, and there was no obligation on Tracy's part to
expend any funds from the $50,000 note at all.

Tracy's

failure to take any action whatever for nearly a year beyond
the note's stated due date confirms this.
Tracy alleged in the lower court that the trust
deed, Exhibit 2-P, was executed to secure a note (Exhibit 3-P)
dated December, 19 72, made by Seiger Distributing Co. payable
to Tracy secured by a financing statement covering inventory
(bicycles).

(R. 258).

However, the 1972 note (Exhibit 3-P) continued
beyond March 14, 1973, and was not renewed by the March 14,
1973, note until May 10, 1974.

(R. 275). The March 14, 1973

note (Exhibit 1-P) and the trust deed (Exhibit 2-P)
nowhere recite that they were executed to secure the 1972
note or debt it evidenced.

No funds were disbursed or set

aside for the March 14, 197 3 note, but the contention that
the note was to provide additional security for the 1972 note
is completedly contradicted by the wording of the documents
and the testimony of Mr. Bagley:

(R. 265)

Q.

As a matter of fact, it [the March,
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-171973 note] could be drawn on for various purposes,
couldn't it?
A.

Yes, there was no stipulation as to appointed

amount of money for a particular purpose.

(Emphasis

Supplied).

The note and trust deed (Exhibits 1-P and 2-P)
do not state that they are security for an antecedent indebtedness.

The evidence is in fact to the contrary as

cited above.
That an antecedent debt in a proper case may act
as the indebtedness for a new note and mortgage is not contested.

In Abraham v. Abraham, 15 Utah 2d 430 (1964) this

court held that an antecedent indebtedness may be consideration
for a note and mortgage executed to evidence and secure an
antecedent debt.

In the Abraham case, the mortgage and note

challenged were executed pursuant to a written contract
providing for the note and mortgage, along with the payment
of $350.00 cash.
In the instant case, Mr. Bagley testified that
although the proceeds of the note (Exhibit 1-P) were going to
be placed in a bank control account until June 1, 1973 (R. 264),
nothing was done.
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-18(R. 270)

Q.

So, in fact, in March of 1973

when the note and trust deed were given, there were no
funds disbursed by the bank [Tracy Collins] to an account,
to Seigers, or to anybody else?
A.

From the —

(R. 275)

Q.

not from the $50,000.

And then no funds were disbursed

at that time, no account was set up, nothing was done
with reference to those two documents until May of 1974?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

So would it be a fair statement to say

that as of May 10th, 1974 that was the first time that
any funds or any accounting of any nature was set up on
the $50,000 note dated March 14, 197 3?
A.

Yes.

The facts of the Tracy and Seiger transaction based
on admissions by Mr. Bagley, are not adequate to support
Tracy's position that a lien attached, good against all subsequent encumbrancers, before any real consideration in the
form of advances existed.

Neither the trust deed nor the note

recites that it secures any specific existing debt.
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The

-19clear testimony in evidence is that Exhibit 1-P did not
evidence any debt until May 10, 1974.

Where an antecedent

indebtedness is to be secured by a mortgage, a description
of such may easily be inserted in the instrument.
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, § 152 states as follows:
It is a general rule of law that a
mortgage must truly describe the debt intended to be secured, including the nature
thereof, and that an obligation is not
secured by a mortgage unless it comes
fairly within the terms of the mortgage.
* The trust deed in this case, Exhibit 2-P, was
issued to secure an indebtedness evidenced by the $50,000 note,
Exhibit 1-P, not the $55,000 note, Exhibit 3-P.

CONCLUSION
Tracy is not entitled to priority before May 10,
1974.

Tracy had complete control of the situation for many

months and could have taken steps to perfect its security -and
priority position.

Instead, it held in limbo for 14 months

a note by parties different from the original debtor;
the trust deed covered property other than that used
as security for the $55,000 note; there is nothing in
the trust deed to indicate that it was security for or in
any manner connected with any debt other than the note
for $50,00 0; and Tracy's own witness confirmed that there
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•20was no indebtedness on the $50,000 note until May 10, 1974,
Tracy is not entitled to priority before that date.
DATED t h i s

ghd

day of August, 1975

Respectfully submitted,
WATKINS & FABER
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